This paper deals with the approximation of Nash equilibria in m-player games. We present conditions under which an approximating sequence of games admits nearequilibria that approximate near-equilibria in the limit game. We apply the results to two classes of games: (i) a duopoly game approximated by a sequence of matrix games, and (ii) a stochastic game played under the S-adapted information structure approximated by games played over a sampled event tree. Numerical illustrations show the usefulness of this approximation theory.
Introduction
Game theory has known a considerable development in the past few decades, however relatively few results have been proposed for the approximation of equilibrium solutions in nonzero-sum games. The aim of this paper is to provide conditions under which the exact or -equilibrium solutions in a normal form nonzero-sum game with strategies selected in a normed space can be approximated by the exact or -equilibrium solutions of a "converging" sequence of games. This question occurs very naturally in the implementation of numerical techniques for the computation of Nash equilibria or in the simplification of "large scale" games like, for example, those that are defined on a stochastic event tree when the players use the so-called S-adapted information structure, introduced in Haurie et al. (1987) and (1990) , and further studied in Haurie and Moresino (to appear) . Our approach to a theory of approximation for nonzero-sum games can be linked with the work of Whitt (1980) , and references in Tidball and Altman (1996) and Tidball et al. (1997) , dealing with zero-sum games, that appeared more recently.
In relatively loose terms, the general problem of approximating equilibria in nonzero-sum games can be formulated as follows. Let G be an m-player game in normal form, with strategy sets in normed spaces. Let G n , n ∈ N be a sequence of "approximating" m-player games with strategy sets that may be different from those used for the game G. We look for conditions under which: (i) If there exists a sequence of n -equilibria to the games G n , n ∈ N, n → , that corresponds, in some appropriate way to be defined shortly, to a converging sequence in the normed space of strategies for G, then the limit is an -equilibrium in G. Furthermore, the sequence of n -equilibrium valuesJ n converges within to an equilibrium valueJ in the limit game [Result (1) of Theorem 3.1]; (ii) For any converging sequence n → , any > , for n large enough, an nequilibrium of G n corresponds to an -equilibrium of G [Result (2) of Theorem 3.1]; (iii) For any > 0, there exists an -equilibrium to the game G that also corresponds to an -equilibrium to the games G n , for n large enough [Result (3) of Theorem 3.1]; (iv) For any equilibrium valueJ of the game G and for any > 0, there exists a converging sequenceJ n →J such thatJ n is an -equilibrium value for the game G n [Result (4) of Theorem 3.1].
A fundamental ingredient of a theory of approximation will be the definition of a set of correspondences that permit one to associate with a strategy vector in G n , n ∈ N, a strategy vector in G and vice versa. These correspondences will have to satisfy enough regularity conditions for the convergence results to hold. This paper provides such a set of conditions. Similar problems were studied by Cavazzuti and Pacchiarotti in (1986) , and by Morgan and Raucci (1997) , also dealing with the approximation of nonzerosum games. These authors use the notions of " and strict -approximate Nash equilibrium" that are a further relaxation of the Nash conditions. In Cavazzuti and Pacchiarotti (1986) , it is shown that the limit of a converging sequence of -approximate Nash equilibria in a sequence of approximating games G n is anapproximate Nash equilibrium in the limit game G. The paper by Morgan and Raucci (1997) relaxes the assumptions under which the previous result holds and shows that under appropriate assumptions, any -approximate Nash equilibrium in the game G can be approached by a sequence of -approximate Nash equilibria in the games G n . In these papers, all the approximating games have the same strategy sets, only the payoff functions differ and the method of proof uses convergence properties for the strategies. In the present paper, we avoid assumptions related to convergence in the strategy space. Furthermore, in Morgan and Raucci (1997) , convexity properties play an important role whereas in this paper we do not use any to prove the results. However, in the present paper, the regularity properties and the uniform convergence assumptions on the payoff functions are quite restrictive, so we cannot claim to be more general than Cavazzuti and Pacchiarotti (1986) , and Morgan and Raucci (1997) . Our set of conditions are different and may prove to be easier to verify for some dynamic games.
The paper is organised as follows. In Sec. 2, we present as a motivating example the approximation of a simple duopoly game via a sequence of bimatrix games. This permits us to illustrate the use of correspondences between the limit and the approximating games, and to observe the convergence of Nash equilibria solutions. In Sec. 3, we derive the main convergence theorems. In Sec. 4, we apply the theory to the approximation of a static Nash equilibrium in a concave continuous game by Nash equilibria in m-matrix games. In Sec. 5, we apply the theory to a class of stochastic games with the S-adapted information structure.
A Motivating Example
Consider a duopoly game where two firms supply a market characterised by the (inverse) demand law
] is the quantity supplied by firm i and p(q 1 , q 2 ) is the market clearing price. The firms payoff functions are given by
where κ i is a positive parameter, representing the unit production cost of firm i.
We have solved different problems with parameters summarised in Table 1 . For all these problems, the existence and uniqueness conditions of Rosen (1965) are satisfied. We compare the equilibrium pairs in the continuous duopoly game with the equilibrium pairs for the approximating games obtained when one discretises the interval [0, 10] with a grid mesh 0.1. Associated with each discretisation is defined a bimatrix game, the equilibria of which are computed via the algorithm of Audet et al. (1999) (this algorithm computes all the equilibria in a bimatrix game). The following table shows the results obtained. The equilibrium strategies for the duopoly games are given with a precision of 10 −4 . We notice that all the approximating games, except for E3 have a single equilibrium that is very close to the duopoly solution. In E3, the approximating game has three equilibria, the third one involving mixed strategies. If one takes the grid's mesh equal to 0.05, the approximating game has one equilibrium with both controls equal to 0.905. This clearly illustrates a convergence property of the sequence of approximating matrix We assume that each strategy set U i , i ∈ M, of the game G is a closed subset in a normed space and the following continuity conditions hold for each payoff function.
Assumption 3.1. In the game G, for each player i ∈ M, the payoff function satisfies
Remark 3.2. Usually, for establishing existence of equilibria one assumes continuity of the payoff functions and compactness of the strategy sets. Indeed this implies the above assumptions.
Approximating games
We consider a sequence of "approximating" m-player games
where U n i (resp. J n i ) is the set of strategies (resp. the payoff function) of player i for the nth game. The strategy sets in the game G n can be very different from those defined for the limit game G. For example, U n i is a finite set or its convex hull, whereas U i is a general convex set. So we introduce a class of mappings π n i and σ n i that will permit us to establish a correspondence between strategies in G n and strategies in G and vice versa. In order for the games G n to approximate the game G, there must be some "continuity properties" satisfied. We suppose the following
for which the following conditions hold:
Remark 3.3. In the case where for all n the sets U n i are identical to the set U i , and where the functions π n i and σ n i are taken as the identity, then assumptions (A2) to (A6) are a slight relaxation to the uniform convergence of J n i to J i . Definition 3.3. Consider a game G = (J, U) that satisfies Condition (A1). We say that a sequence of games G n = (J n , U n ) is a good approximating sequence for the game G, if there exist functions π n and σ n such that conditions (A2) to (A6) hold.
Main results
Theorem 3.1. Let {G n } n∈N be a good approximating sequence for the game G. Then the following results hold true.
. . , be a sequence of n -Nash equilibria for the respective games G n . If π n (ū n ) converges toū ∈ U and n converges to¯ , then for any >¯ ,ū is an -Nash equilibrium for the game G, and the equilibria values converge within¯ , i.e.
Result (2). Consider a sequence of real numbers { n } that converges to¯ .
) be an n -Nash equilibrium for the game G n . Then for any >¯ , there exists N such that, for all n > N, π n (ū n ) is an -Nash equilibrium for the limit game G.
Result (3). Let¯ ≥ 0 be given and letū be an¯ -Nash equilibrium for the limit game G. Then for any >¯ , there exists an integer N such that for any n > N, σ n (ū) is an -Nash equilibrium for the game G n . Result (4). Suppose that the limit game G admits a Nash equilibrium (not necessarily unique). LetJ be the payoff vector value associated with that equilibrium. Then for any > 0, there exists a sequenceJ n that converges toJ, and such thatJ n is the payoff vector value associated with an -equilibrium for the game G n .
Remark 3.4. Result (1) is in the spirit of Cavazzuti and Pacchiarotti (1986) , and Morgan and Raucci (1999) . Results (2) to (4) are quite different since they do not involve the convergence in the strategy sets.
Proof. Result (1). We first prove thatū is an -equilibrium, i.e. for all i in M, all >¯ ,
By the fact that the sequence π n −i (ū n −i ) converges toū −i and the lower continuity of J i in u −i (implied by Condition (A1a) in Assumption 3.1), for all 2 > 0 sufficiently small, one can find N i2 such that for all n > N i2 and all u i ∈ U i ,
By the fact thatū n is an n -equilibrium, and by Condition (A2) of Assumption 3.2, it follows that for 3 > 0 arbitrarily small, one can find N i3 such that for all n > N i3 ,
Asū n is an n -Nash equilibrium for the game G n , the following inequality holds
By (A5), for any 4 > 0 arbitrarily small there exists N i4 such that for all n > N i4 ,
From Eqs. (3) to (6), the upper semi-continuity of J i in all its arguments, the convergence of the sequence π n (ū n ) toū and the convergence of the sequence n tō , it follows that, for any n ≥ max(N i2 , N i3 , N i4 , i ∈ M), the following inequality is true
This shows thatū is an -Nash equilibrium for the game G, with =¯ + . Since 2 , 3 and 4 can be chosen arbitrarily small, the result follows.
To prove the convergence of the values J n (ū n ) to J(ū), consider the sequence
. By Condition (A2) and sinceū n is n equilibrium for the game G n , one has for any ε > 0 and n sufficiently large
By Condition (A1a) of Assumption 3.1, we can write at the limit
By (6), (A1a) and (A1b), we also have
Therefore, we conclude from (7) and (8) that Inequality (1) is satisfied.
Result (2). Let = −¯ > 0. By (A2), we know that there exists N i1 such that for any n > N i1 we have for all u i ∈ U i ,
Sinceū n is an n -Nash equilibrium in G n , and since the sequence n converges tō , there exists N i2 such that for any n > N i2 and all u i ∈ U i ,
Now by (A5), there exists N i3 such that for any n > N i3 ,
Considering Eqs. (9) to (11) together, it follows that for any n > max(N i1 , N i2 , N i3 , i ∈ M), we have for any i ∈ M,
This ends the proof of Result (2). Result (3). Let = −¯ > 0. By (A4), there exists N i2 such that for any n > N i2 and u
Sinceū is an¯ -Nash equilibrium, the following inequality holds for all u n i
and, by (A3), there exists N i3 such that, for any n > N i3 ,
Considering together Eqs. (13) to (15) for any n > max(N i2 , N i3 , i ∈ M), we obtain that
and this ends the proof of Result (3). Result (4). Letū be the Nash equilibrium strategy profile of game G associated with the Nash equilibrium valueJ. For any 1 > 0, according to Result (3) established above, there exists N 1 such that for any n ≥ N 1 , σ n (ū) is an 1 -Nash equilibrium for the game G n . DenoteJ
). According to Assumption (A3), for any 2 > 0, we can choose n sufficiently large, say n ≥ N 2 , so that for each iJ
We also need an estimate forJ
If Condition (A6a) holds, then for any 2 , we can choose n sufficiently large, n ≥ N 2 such that for each i,
which provides the desired inequality. If condition (A6a) does not hold, then we rely on (A6b) or (A6c). Since σ n (ū) is an 1 -Nash equilibrium for the game G n , n ≥ N 1 , by Result (2) established above, we know that for any 3 > 1 , there exists N 3 such that, for any n ≥ N 3 , π n (σ n (ū)) is an 3 -Nash equilibrium for the game G. Using Assumption (A5) we get that for any 4 , there exists N 4 such that for any n > N 4 , for each i
If Condition (A6b) is satisfied, then for each player i and any 5 > 0, there exists N 5 such that for any n ≥ N 5 ,
which provides again the desired inequality, since we can choose = max{ 1 , 2 , 4 + 5 } arbitrarily small. If Condition (A6c) holds, together with (A1a) and (A1b) it implies that there exists N 5 , such that for any n ≥ N 5 ,
This completes the proof since we can choose = max{ 1 , 2 , 4 + 5 } arbitrarily small.
Remark 3.5. In fact, the different results established under the umbrella of Theorem 3.1 do not use exactly the same subsets of the Assumptions (A1) to (A6). Indeed, Result (1) requires only Assumptions (A1), (A2) and (A5); Result (2) requires only Assumptions (A2) and (A5); Result (3) requires only Assumptions (A3) and (A4); and Result (4) requires Assumptions (A1) to (A6).
Remark 3.6. In the special case of zero-sum games, the convergence condition (A1) is slightly stronger than the one proposed in Tidball and Altman (1996) , and Tidball et al. (1997) , a in which the continuity assumption of (A1a) is replaced by lower-semicontinuity.
a See Assumptions (A3) and (A4) in that reference. Note that in these assumptions there is a typo, and u and v should be interchanged.
Approximation of a Continuous m-Player Game by a Sequence of m-Matrix Games
Let us return to a class of games similar to the Cournot game explored in Sec. 2, and show that we can easily define a good approximating sequence of matrix games.
Consider an m-player game G = (J, U), J = (J 1 , . . . , J m ), U = U 1 × U 2 · · · U m , each strategy set U i being endowed with a metric d i . Define a sequence (U n i ) of finite subsets of U i . For each n, define payoff functions J n i as the restriction of the functions J i to the strategy set
. This defines for each n an m-matrix game G n = (J n , U n ). Suppose the following is satisfied.
Assumption 4.1. For any > 0 and
Then the following holds true.
Proposition 4.1. Suppose that for each i ∈ M, J i is continuous. Then the sequence of m-matrix games G n defined above is a good approximating sequence for the game G.
Proof. Define the functions π n i and σ n i as follows π
From the definition of the functions σ n i , and by Assumption 4.1, it should be clear that, for any u i ∈ U i , the sequence u n i = σ n i (u i ) converges to u i . According to the continuity of the functions J i we have
which imply Conditions (A2) to (A6) that define a good approximating sequence. Uniformity of convergence is implied by the compactness of all strategy sets.
Approximation of Games with S-Adapted Information Structure
In this section, we apply the theory of approximation to a class of stochastic dynamic games, played under the S-adapted information structure (see Gürkan et al. (1999) , Haurie et al. (1987) , and Haurie et al. (1990) for an introduction to this type of information structure).
Two-stage games
We first consider a two-stage m-player game. Let (Ω, 2 Ω , p(·)) be a finite probability space. At first stage the players have to choose an action, let us denote a 1 = (a For given action profiles a 1 , a 2 , and for a sample value ω ∈ Ω, the reward received by player i is given by
where
i are two real functions. We call strategies with recourse the class of strategies that corresponds to this information structure, also called S-adapted to emphasise the fact that the decisions of players are adapted to the sample realisation of the random element.
For player i, such a strategy is defined by the pair u i = (a For any strategy profile u we define the payoff function J i of player i by
The approximating sequence G n is obtained by replacing, for each n, the sample set Ω with a subset Ω n ⊂ Ω, and by introducing a probability law p n (·) on Ω n . A strategy in G n for player i is thus a pair u
A strategy profile u n is defined as usual. The strategy sets S i and S n i for G and G n respectively are endowed with the natural topology. For example, if u i = (a i , α i ) and u i = (a i , α i ) in S n , we use the distance
We use the following:
Assumption 5.1. ∈Ω n p(ω)=0 ; (C4) The probabilities on Ω and Ω n satisfy lim n→+∞ sup ω∈Ω n |p n (ω) − p(ω)| = 0.
Remark 5.1. Condition (C1) in Assumption 5.1 implies that Condition (A1) holds for the payoff functions J i of the game G. We also notice that, since Ω is finite, it only makes sense to consider a sequence where Ω n ≡ Ω when n is large enough. Then Condition (C3) is trivially satisfied. We nevertheless keep this contourned formulation to prepare for a possible future extension of this type of results to the case of an infinite (countable) probability space. Such an extension is nontrivial since it requires us to drop the assumption of closedness of the strategy sets.
Proposition 5.1. Suppose Assumption 5.1 holds. Then the games G n constitute a good approximating sequence in the sense of Definition 3.3.
Proof. We define the functions π n i , σ n i as follows π
and 
where ω n is some element of Ω n . Thus, according to Conditions (C3) and (C4) and since the reward function f 2 i ,at stage 2 is bounded, we have lim
which establishes that Condition (A2) holds. We can show in the same way that Conditions (A3) to (A6) are also satisfied. Indeed for v such that v i = (b 1 i , β i ) ∈ S i , and for u = (u 1 , . . . , , u m ) such that u i = (a
and
We get (A3) to (A6) as a consequence of f 2 i being bounded and Conditions (C3) and (C4).
K-stage games
We consider now a game with K stages. At each stage, the players observe the realisation of a discrete stochastic process and choose their respective actions according to the history of the stochastic process.
The dynamics of the stochastic process is defined by the transition matrices P k , k = 1, . . . , K − 1, where the (n, m) element P k n,m is the probability for the stochastic state variable to jump from state n at stage k to state m at stage k + 1. So to any realisation of the stochastic sequence, from stage 1 to stage
, is associated a probability
where p 1 (ω 1 ) is probability distribution at stage 1. (23)] is strictly positive. We denote W the set of feasible scenarios.
A strategy u i of player i will be a vector α
is a function that associates with any realisation of the stochastic variable at stage k the action chosen by the player i at stage k in the compact set
These strategy sets can be endowed with the uniform convergence (in ω) topology.
We denote S i a set of admissible mappings from the set of feasible scenarios W to the set A 
This assumption implies that the decisions at stagek are adapted to the realisation ω 1 , . . . , ωk of the stochastic-state variable. However, the decision of a player is not adapted to the realisation of the decision process of the other players. This is consistent with the S-adapted information structure, introduced in Haurie et al. (1990) and further studied in Haurie and Moresino (to appear) .
Since the choice of actions of player i is not affected by the choice of any of his opponent, there exists a one to one mapping from the set S i of strategies with recourse to the setS i . This mapping associates with the strategy u i = (α
) of S i , the non-anticipative function,ū i defined bȳ
For any choice of a strategy profile u = (u 1 , u 2 · · · u m ), and any feasible scenario ω, the player i receives the payment
where the player i's state variable is determined by the evolution equation
where g i (·) are continuous functions with bounded values. Equivalently, if u = (ū 1 ,ū 2 · · ·ū m ) is the corresponding non-anticipative function profile, the player i's payment is defined as
Again, for a strategy profile u the evaluation function is defined as the expected value of J i (u, ω),
With the use of non-anticipative functions as strategies, the game can thus be formulated in its normal form.
We define an approximating sequence of games G n , where G n is played with an event tree of feasible scenarios W n defined as a subset W . The probability of a scenario in W n is given by a probability law p n (·). Let us denoteS n i the set of strategies of player i in the game G n .
where (ū i (ω)) k represents the investment in production capacity for firm i at stage k, whereas β i is the capacity depreciation rate for firm i. For the numerical illustration, the depreciation rates are β 1 = 0.08 and β 2 = 0.06. The admissible controls are those which keep the capacity non-negative.
The stochastic state of the market is represented by a discrete-state Markov chain. For the numerical illustration, we assume that the market can be in one of three possible states, Ω = {1, 2, 3}. We assume that the inverse demand law at stage k depends on the market condition ω k in the following way
Here D is the market clearing price, given the total supply
The coefficients are: a(1) = 120, a(2) = 100, a(3) = 80, b(1) = b(2) = b(3) = 20, c(1) = 3, c(2) = 2.5 and c(3) = 2. The dynamics of the Markov chain is described by the following transition matrix: 
, for all k = 1, . . . , K −1. We also assume that each firm has a quadratic maintenance and investment cost. So the profit functions at stage k are given by
The discount rates are ρ 1 = ρ 2 = 0.09 and the time horizon is K = 10. This is the discrete time duopoly studied in Haurie and Moresino (to appear). Theorem 7 therein, establishes existence and uniqueness for the Nash equilibrium. This dynamic game exhibits a so-called "turnpike property" which means that, for each discrete state, an attractor called "turnpike", exists for the optimal trajectory of the production capacity of each firm.
The game is defined over a finite event tree, hence we are in the case where Ω is finite. The approximating sequence of probability measures that we use is obtained through a statistical sampling procedure. The value p n (ω) is the sampling frequency of scenario ω for a sample size n. Note that, in this framework, the probability measure for the first approximating game G 1 is given by a single scenario ω having a probability 1. As n increases, the set of scenarios with nonzero probabilities will become larger since the approximating relative frequencies converge almost surely to the scenario probabilities of G. With probability 1, after a finite number of trials, the set W n of feasible scenarios in G n will be equal to W . By the strong law of large numbers, Assumptions (D3) and (D4) are satisfied here, in the sense of almost sure convergence. With probability 1, the sequence G n will be a good approximating sequence.
To illustrate the convergence of the presented sampling method, we compute the turnpike values when the market is in state 1, for two different sample size, namely n = 100 and n = 10 000. In each case, ten different samples have been randomly drawn and the S-adapted equilibra computed for the sampled event trees.
For the game G the turnpike values, computed through a direct method, are 0.927 for firm 1 and 0.931 for firm 2. The results for the approximating games are summarised in Tables 3 and 4 which clearly show convergence. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have provided conditions which imply that a sequence of approximating games will have ( ) equilibria that approximate an ( ) equilibrium in the limit game. These results have been illustrated on a static Cournot duopoly game and on a stochastic version of the Cournot game with the S-adapted information structure.
